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DEPENDENT AUTONOMY.
TOWARDS A CONTEXTUALISED AND DIALOGIC 
AIM FOR MORAL EDUCATION
PATRICK ALTENA, CHRIS A.M. HERMANS AND PEER L.H. SCHEEPERS
Radboud University Nijmegen
Abstract
This article presents two approaches to moral education: the autonomy approach and the het-
eronomy approach. Generally the two approaches are considered to be mutually exclusive. The
study described here, conducted among Dutch teachers at Catholic primary schools, reflects a
positive relation between the two approaches. This leads to the assumption that teachers regard
moral education as a dialogical, embodied and contextual process (Vygotski). In order to achieve
autonomy, notions of the good life need to be transmitted to children.
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1. INTRODUCTION
By and large the debate on moral education in schools is governed by two
approaches. The first is to initiate children into particular sets of behav-
ioural rules in the hope that they will observe these both now and in later
life. We shall call that the heteronomy approach. This approach to moral
education came under heavy fire from thinkers of the Enlightenment and
Romanticism. Instead of inducting children into a moral tradition, they felt
that individuals should be enabled to rid themselves of the alleged ballast
of transmitted moral tradition. This is what we shall call the autonomy
approach.
In the Western world the autonomy approach became the dominant view
in moral education. If that were to apply to Catholic schools as well, we
face a problem. After all, the raison d’être of these schools is to induct chil-
dren into a specific religious tradition. Do teachers at these schools prefer
a heteronomous aim for moral education or do they support the dominant
autonomy approach? Our research is meant to answer this question.
We start by analysing the autonomy approach (2). The third section explores
the heteronomy approach (3). The fourth section reports on an empirical
study conducted among Catholic primary school teachers, in which we
inquired into their ideas on the aims of moral education (4). As will be
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seen, the results of this study are surprising from the angle of the theoret-
ical premises outlined in the second and third section. The disparity between
theoretical premises and empirical research results leads to a reconsidera-
tion of the theory. To this end we use the notion of dependent autonomy
evolved by Tim Sprod (2001) (5).
2. MORAL EDUCATION: DEVELOPMENT OF AN AUTONOMOUS SUBJECT
The autonomy approach is rooted in both the Enlightenment and Romanticism.
The notion that moral education should contribute to the formation of free
moral subjects unfettered by any tradition was first propounded by Kant. In
his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1974) he presented his famous
analysis of free will. In his opinion free will is the only thing that can be
called ‘good’ in the proper sense of the word. The will is free only if it obeys
no law other than the inner law of reason. Hence a will that is obedient to
anything else, such as desires or the will of other people, is not free: it is
Willkür. Kant maintained that to be rational a law must by definition be uni-
versally valid. This also applies to moral law. Kant believed that the cate-
gorical imperative was such a universal law: always act in such way that
the rule governing your behaviour could serve as a universal law.
This is a formal approach to moral judgment. Kant consciously avoids
giving a substantive definition of goodness. Good actions are not aimed at
realising ‘the good life’ or ‘the common good’ but is behaviour prompted
by considerations arising from a specific procedure. It was this formal char-
acter of Kantian ethics that made its influence felt in moral pedagogics.
Educating a child to become a moral subject, it is argued, entails imparting
the skills needed for passing an independent moral judgment: following Kant,
some moral educators claim that substantive evaluation of educands’ moral
judgment is a pernicious attempt to condemn them to permanent ‘tutelage’.1
We find the same reverence for individual development among the roman-
ticists. Here, however, the focus is not on discovering a universal moral law
but on individuals finding their unspoilt, authentic self free from the oppres-
sion of civilisation. This line of thought found an eloquent exponent in Jean-
Jacques Rousseau with his Emile ou l’education. Children’s true nature can
only be cultivated by freeing them from the grip of civilisation that seeks
to warp them and alienate them from themselves (Rousseau 1967). In more
recent literature on moral pedagogics such trust in the goodness of human
spontaneity is reflected in what is known as value clarification.Value clari-
fication presents methods and procedures to assist pupils in clarifying their
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preferences (2.1). Inasmuch as value clarification emphasises the procedural
aspects of moral thought it is endebted to Kant. In its accentuation of the
individual learner’s preferences it follows Rousseau.
Value communication is less concerned with individual pupils and their
preferences, but it also sets great store by the procedures necessary to form
a moral judgment. We shall deal with in 2.2.
2.1. Value Clarification
The ‘traditional’2 form of value clarification was first worked out by Raths,
Harmin and Simon in the 1960s and 1970s and was developed further by
Kirschenbaum (cf. Van der Ven 1998, 235, 236). Value clarification implies
that pupils take cognisance of their own values. Raths and his co-authors
(1966, 39-44) contrast this with the traditional aim of moral education. It
was a reaction to the plurality of values that characterises secularised soci-
ety and perplexes pupils: which values must one choose? To help them
make a choice Rath et al. present a utilitarian definition of value: value is
what I give preference to. One has to get rid of every predetermined pref-
erence for certain values that pupils are supposed to internalise. They should
consider the various options, make their choice without any external pres-
sure and then publicly declare what they have chosen. The educator or
teacher’s task is confined to ensuring that pupils deliberate carefully in deter-
mining their preferences and pointing out possible alternatives to, and con-
sequences of, their current preference which they may have overlooked.
In other words, teachers should make sure that pupils follow the correct
procedure in making their evaluation.
Hence moral education in the sense of value clarification entails declar-
ing a preference after considering the alternatives and assessing the desir-
ability of the consequences. It is not sufficient for pupils to indicate their
preferences in a kind of hedonistic solipsism. Value clarification also entails
recognising the consequences entailed by a particular choice (Raths et al.
1966, 62). Raths illustrates the point with the following example. A class
debates which is better, honesty or dishonesty. At some point one of the
pupils asks whether, if one opts for dishonesty, one can crib during tests.
The teacher comments that the consequence of this choice would be that
she would punish the person for cribbing (Raths et al. 1966, 114-15). If
value clarification were to be confined to expressing preferences, Van der
Ven’s observation that this implies inconsistency would be justified (Van
der Ven 1998, 242). But if the clarification process also entails, as it does
for Raths et al., pointing out that certain preferences could have certain
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less agreeable consequences, then there is no inconsistency. Apart from being
confronted with the consequences of their choices, pupils are also intro-
duced to values not found among the preferences in their life world. To
this end one could use what are known as value sheets. One example of
such a sheet tells how American students applying for a bursary in terms
of the National Defence Educational Act of 1958 had to sign a statement
to the effect that they did not belong to any organisation whose aim was
the violent overthrow of the government. The students were asked what
they thought about this requirement and were then requested to think of
reasons why educational institutions objected to it (Raths et al. 1966, 98).
Here, too, the educator’s role is limited to stimulating pupils to involve as
many elements as possible in their appraisal of their moral judgment.
Raths et al. do not say much about the course of this process. The idea
seems to be that if it is spontaneous and free from coercion or outside in-
fluences, it will automatically bring out the best in human beings. Except
for its religious connotations, the slogan of Rousseau’s Emile, (Rousseau
1967), could equally well have been the slogan of value clarification. Raths
and his co-authors express themselves in similar vein when they posit that
‘human beings hold the possibility of being thoughtful and wise and that
the most appropriate values will come when persons use their intelligence
freely and reflectively to define their relationships with each other and with
an ever-changing world’ (Raths et al. 1966, 39).
The sketchy description of the manner in which pupils arrive at their
moral judgment prompts Van der Ven to make some critical comments. He
observes that Raths et al. describe the appraisal of preferences as a process
in which a choosing ‘I’ has a fully lucid ‘self’ at its disposal. In fact, Van
der Ven continues, the choosing self is confronted with the need to construct
and reconstruct a self-image, which entails questions aimed at the unity of
past, present and future – questions such as: ‘Who am I?’ ‘Who do I want
to be?’ ‘What do I live for?’ Van der Ven (1998, 258-259) concludes:
These questions are inextribcably interwoven with one’s own individual identity. They refer
descriptively to what and where one is, and normatively to what one desires to be or
become . . . [Clarification, therefore,] is a mode of self-understanding. This is done by tak-
ing up, questioning, and critically reflecting what biography, community and traditon have
said that one is, must commit oneself to, and ought to do . . . ‘self’-clarification is a
hermeneutical process.
Van der Ven puts the clarification of personal preferences in the context of
the person’s biography. Following Ricoeur, he points out that this construc-
tion does not occur in a moral vacuum where ‘one can choose freely’, but
that preferences are always determined in a setting steeped in ‘biography,
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community and tradition’. Weighing these choices requires that pupils are
capable of both constructing their own biography and applying hermeneu-
tic strategies to it.
2.2. Value Communication
Apart from criticism of the conception of self-understanding in value clari-
fication, it is also accused of concentrating too exclusively on the individ-
ual learner. In its endeavour to promote the cultivation of an autonomous
subject, value clarification shares the rejection of external moral authority
with the Kantian view of autonomy, although it makes no mention of a
universal moral law. Like Rousseau, it puts the accent on spontaneity and
the search for a (supposedly) pure inner self uncorrupted by civilisation.
The focus is on how the educator can assist pupils in their introspection of
their inner selves. To Raths et al. the pupils’ introspective activity is
monadic: the ‘I’ who indicates the preference and the ‘self’ in which these
preferences are encountered are not separate. Normal individuals, it is
assumed, always have access to their desires, wishes and preferences.
Kirschenbaum (1977, 148) maintains that value clarification should
include communication between pupils. He distinguishes between three phases
in their communication: communicating one’s own message as clearly as
possible to the rest of the group; willingness to enter into the other’s per-
spective; and a capacity to resolve conflicts between contradictory values.
Pupils’ choices are made in the context of a pluriform society. This has an
effect not only on their hermeneutic introspection of the self but also on
their communication with one another. Van der Ven (1998, 266-278) argues
that cultural pluriformity should be taken into account when one appeals
to pupils to transpose themselves to other people’s perspectives. The inter-
cultural model makes a distinction between evaluation and the frame of
reference in which it takes place. If there are two groups with different pref-
erences, the first step in the intercultural variant of value communication
is that groups A and B both interpret their own viewpoints within their respec-
tive frames of reference (auto-interpretation of A by A and of B by B).
Then group A interprets B’s evaluation in A’s frame of reference (auto-
interpretation of B by A), while B interprets A’s values in B’s frame of ref-
erence (auto-interpretation of A by B). Finally A interprets B’s values from
B’s perspective (allo-interpretation of B by A) and B interprets A’s values
from A’s perspective (allo-interpretation of A by B). Van der Ven (1998,
272)) calls this method perspective exchange. Perspective exchange makes
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it possible to compare viewpoints cross-culturally and deepens reflection
on alternatives to the pupils own choices.
3. MORAL EDUCATION: INITIATION INTO HUMAN COEXISTENCE
In addition to moral educationists who focus on developing the skills
needed to form a moral judgment, there are others who maintain that indi-
viduals derive their status as moral beings from their membership of a com-
munity. This could be a nation-state or some other community. If this is
one’s emphasis, it is important that children should learn the values of this
(national or other) community and internalise them.
With reference to the (democratic constitutional) state these scholars main-
tain that it can only function if the population’s dealings in the public domain
are guided by certain values. In the first part of this section we try to deter-
mine which norms and values are at issue.
Within the framework of public judicial institutions groups emerge who
expect the state not merely to protect their individual civil rights, but also
to respect their rights as (language, ethnic or religious) groups. Here one
thinks of national minorities and indigenous peoples, respectively defined
by Kymlicka (2000, 20; 120-132) as ‘groups that formed complete and func-
tioning societies in their historic homeland prior to being incorporated into
a larger state’ and ‘stateless nations’. In many instances, such as the Basque
Provinces and Corsica, solutions found within the framework of existing
state contexts satisfy the vast majority of national minorities.
The (descendants of) Muslim immigrants in Western Europe likewise
demand state recognition of their religious and cultural identity. We shall
not dwell on the problems that national and immigrant minorities pose for
moral education. Instead we concentrate on the relation between the civic
education of children in a liberal state and initiation into a religious com-
munity (3.3). The first aspect (preparing children for civic citizenship) is
dealt with in 3.1. In 3.2 we look at the possible role of education in initiat-
ing children into a specific community such as the Roman Catholic Church.
3.1. Civic Citizenship Education
Opinions are divided about the role a liberal, democratic state should play
in the education of its future citizens. Gutman (1995, 557-560) distinguishes
between a political liberal and a comprehensive liberal approach. Comprehen-
sive liberalism is not confined to political principles but includes a conception
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of the good life, seen as a life that allows scope for individuality and auton-
omy. Schools should cultivate pupils’ ability to value such a life (cf. Enslin
et al. 2001, 129) Comprehensive liberals like Macedo and Rawls maintain
that values such as mutual respect and a sense of fairness should also fea-
ture in children’s education towards citizenship in a liberal society (quoted
in Gutman 1995, 561).3
Political liberals, on the other hand, maintain that liberalism is simply a
political doctrine which, according to Rousseau (1967), is concerned about
peace rather than virtue. They do not take a position on mutually contra-
dictory conceptions of the good life and have no ambition to teach chil-
dren that an independent, autonomous life is ‘better’ or more virtuous than
other ways of realising the good life. They also do not see it as their task
to teach children to think independently. According to Hofstee (1992, 270-
275) the school should refrain from any form of value transmission and
confine itself to imparting testable knowledge. Parents’ right to ‘be differ-
ent’ should be respected: the state should refrain from defining to what extent
a deviant view can be considered ‘rational’, especially when such a view
stems from religious beliefs (Galston 1995, 527-534).4 The only things schools
should combat are repressive and discriminatory practices, since there are
incompatible with good citizenship (Gutman 1995, 559).
The question is whether the two approaches really differ as much as one
is led to believe. Amy Gutman argues that a society in which groups merely
tolerate each other passively (‘live and let live’) and otherwise show no
respect for people from a ‘different’ cultural or religious background makes
the ideal of non-discrimination by a (democratically elected) government
unattainable.5 She also contests the notion that one can, as political liber-
als would wish to,
teach children the skills and virtues of democratic citizenship in a diverse society without
at the same time teaching them many of the virtues and skills of individuality or autonomy
(Gutmann 1995, 563).
She adds that such learning of the ‘virtues and skills of autonomy’ will not
necessarily clash with particular religious ideas or world-views and quotes
John Stuart Mill, who remarks that ‘both entail living one’s life according
to one’s own best lights because one judges this a good way of life’ (quoted
in Gutmann 1995, 563).
Finally she points out that in Western societies only small minorities are
opposed to such values as the individual’s right to pursue the good life
according to his or her lights, the importance of tolerance and respect for
different ideas, and a sense of justice. As an example of such a group she
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cites the Old Order Amish community. Like Galston, she is in favour of
granting the kind of sectarian group that does not want to be part of lib-
eral, democratic society but poses no threat to it a special position in the
area of teaching and education. According to Gutmann the vast majority
of the populations of Western countries can identify with comprehensive
liberal values and there is good reason to believe that without these values
a pluralistic society would be hard put to function if it can do so at all.
3.2. Transmission of Community Values
Apart from being citizens of a state the vast majority of people belong to
all sorts of communities. Communities are characterised by some measure
of interdependence between members, some shared values (Etzioni 1998,
xiii), members’ involvement in maintaining the community, sharing of com-
mon practices, and telling and retelling of narratives (Bellah 1985, 333).
It is these shared practices and constitutive narratives that make it possible
to identify individuals as members of a particular community, since that is
what distinguishes them from other communities. If a neighbourhood
arranges an annual barbecue, one could speak of a (as yet modest) form of
community. In a dormitory town where residents have nothing in common
bar the hedges separating their gardens there are no common practices and
(therefore) no common narratives.
In modern societies people belong to various communities from an early
age: family, neighbourhood, church, associations, school, peer communities
and the like. Initiating children into these community contexts presupposes
familiarising them with community practices and the values undergirding
these. Van der Ven distinguishes between a disciplinary and a socialising
phase. In discipline the accent is on learning and unlearning behaviour. Socia-
lisation is aimed at adopting the moral judgments of behaviour that are
(implicitly or explicitly) laid down by the community. Socialisation can be
completed by means of transmission of values. The child is made aware
of previously unconscious preconceptions, rules and patterns underlying
an actual moral practice (Van der Ven 1998, 43-127).
Transmission of values may be open or closed. To understand the distinc-
tion we first need to comment on the way communities’ ‘constitutive narra-
tives’function. Communities derive the goal orientations for their actions from
these stories. By telling newcomers how jolly last year’s barbecue was long-
standing residents of the neighbourhood encourage new ones to join in the
shared practice of an annual barbecue. In more highly structured commu-
nities the narratives are less situationally linked than in a neighbourhood.
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Often they are ancient, recorded in writing and vested with a measure of
sacrosanctness. Recording constitutive narratives in writing has the effect
of what Ricoeur (1993, 87-106) calls ‘decontextualisation’. Unlike stories
that are communicated orally (as in the case of the neighbourhood barbe-
cue), in the case of written narratives there is no longer any direct com-
munication between sender (narrator) and receiver (listener). In principle
a text can be read and reread by everybody, anywhere, at any time with-
out the reader being able to discover ‘what the author intended’. A speaker
can back up her or his text, a writer can’t. This applies all the more when
constitutive narratives derive from the distant past, as often happens in com-
plex communities. As a result readers are compelled to ‘re-contextualise’
the text. To have even a vague idea of what the text is about they have to
relate it to ‘the world’, that is, the totality of situations to which the text
could refer (Ricoeur 1993, 152).
In the case of narrative texts, relating the ‘world of the the text’ to the
‘world of the reader’ is further complicated because of the focus on char-
acters’ actions. Readers can relate the behavioural orientations encountered
in narrative texts to their own behaviour or that of other people. They can
question the characters’behavioural orientations (or values), agree with them,
differentiate them, reject them, modify their own values accordingly, et cetera.
In this way narrative texts further the reader’s self-understanding (Ricoeur
1993, 122-128). Readers ‘mirror’ their own world (and the behavioural ori-
entations prevailing in it) in the world of the text (and the behavioural ori-
entations prevailing in it).
Some texts have special meaning for particular communities. Here we
think primarily of the holy scriptures of religious communities. Certain inter-
pretations of such texts (co-)determine the community’s self-understand-
ing. People identify themselves as Christians or as Muslims on the basis
of the unique meaning they ascribe to the Bible or the Koran. Every text
that stands the test of time gives birth to interpretive traditions, but in the
case of the constitutive texts of religious communities such interpretations
have strong normative implications. In an ideal or ideological sense at any
rate, they act as the ultimate criterion of behavioural orientations in reli-
gious communities. In many instances divergent interpretations of holy scrip-
tures led to schisms in religious communities.
The conviction that there is only one correct interpretation of holy scrip-
ture leads to a closed form of value transmission. Each successive gener-
ation of believers has to learn the one, fixed interpretation of the sacred
texts by heart and incorporate it into their behaviour (cf. Van der Ven 1998,
131-133). In its most extreme form traditional transmission of values will
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reject any critical questioning of value orientations as an impermissible
deviation from orthodoxy. In addition to the closed form of value trans-
mission there is an open form. The most open approach regards the sacred
text as a means of orientation to the good life. The accent is not on rote
learning and incorporation of fixed value orientations but on an ongoing
process of (joint and dialogic) interpretation and reinterpretation of the sacred
text. Open value transmission seeks to familiarise pupils with the diversity
of traditional interpretations of the text, but also to inculcate the skills needed
to direct these interpretations to the good life lived in conjunction with other
people in a context of just institutions.
3.3. Relation between Liberal and Christian Transmission of Values
To conclude this section we take a brief look at the two forms of trans-
mission of values we have described. As far as community values are con-
cerned we focus on the Christian, more especially the Catholic religious
community. After all, our empirical study concerns teachers in Catholic
primary education.
For a long time the relation between the liberal state and the Catholic
Church was marked by manifest strain. In the 19th century Catholic the-
ologians and church leaders often espoused the cause of the ancien régime
and traditional values, even though some, like Lamennais, defended polit-
ical democracy. In similar fashion liberals adopted an often aggressive polit-
ical stance towards the church.6 At the end of the 19th century the relation
between liberalism and Catholicism came under severe pressure as a result
of the conflict bertween Italian liberals and the Holy See about (inter alia)
the fall of the ecclesiastic state. Against the background of this conflict the
Syllabus Errorum was issued, in which several key liberties were condemned
(Denzinger 1965, 584). This applied only in cases where liberal claims were
considered to conflict with the acquired rights of the Catholic Church. In
the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes and the declaration Dignitatis
Humanae the Second Vatican Council gave its blessing to constitutional
democracy, human rights and the freedom of the individual (Grasso 1995,
33), albeit citing as its motive that these things are necessary to promote
the common good. The premodern concept of the common good and the
fundamental pluralism of the modern liberal state are often viewed as mutu-
ally contradictory. Novak (1989, 145-173) argues that this is not neces-
sarily the case. In his view liberalism aspires not just to freedom for every
person but also to justice for all. Reflection on justice presupposes a vision
of the common good.
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This second aspiration forms the background to the Catholic Church’s
fierce criticism of the excrescences of the free market economy, the con-
comitant of liberalism (Novak 1986, 12-16). This criticism brought vari-
ous (Catholic and Protestant) theologians to the conclusion that, in the words
of the English socialist motto, ‘Christianity is the religion of which social-
ism is the practice’(Novak 1986, 12). Protest against the evil consequences
of the capitalist economic system was forceully expressed in the work of
many Third World liberation theologians, but criticism of the destructive
effects of the free market also came from liberals. Hence Novak (1984, 38)
seems justified when he concludes that Catholic social thougth has slowly
but steadily come to embrace the basic institutions of liberal society.
4. RESEARCH CONSTRUCTION AND AN OVERVIEW
OF PRINCIPAL RESEARCH RESULTS
Above we identified two main trends in the approach to moral education.
The first, which we called the autonomy approach, proceeds from the premise
that moral education should result in individuals who are able to arrive at
a moral judgment free from outside influencing. The outstanding feature
of this approach is its emphasis on the cultivation of skills necessary to
form a moral judgment. The second trend is what we call the heteronomy
approach. Here the accent is on rooting the individual child in social con-
texts. This could be the context of the state or of a specific community. In
our study we settled for the Catholic community.
In this section we consider how teachers involved in the moral educa-
tion of children on a daily basis think about the aims of moral education.
We formulate four research questions and, on the basis of the theoretical
ideas described in sections 2 and 3, we construct four hypotheses (4.1).
Then we describe our data collection and research design (4.2). In 4.3 we
report our findings and answers to the research questions.
4.1. Research Questions and Expectations
We pose four research questions:
1. Do teachers distinguish between two perspectives on moral education?
2. In how far do they agree with these approaches?
3. To what extent do teachers interrelate the aims?
4. Which categories of teachers subscribe to particular perspectives/aims?
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On the basis of our premises we expect the following answers to our research
questions:
1. Teachers distinguish between four aims of moral education: two
‘autonomous’ aims (value clarification and communication of values)
and two ‘heteronomous’aims (civic education and transmission of com-
munity (here Christian) values.
2. In view of the schools’denominational background teachers are expected
to concur with the heteronomous aims of moral education.
3. We expect the correlation between autonomous and heteronomous aims
to be negative.
4. The teachers are classified on the basis of school, class and personal
attributes. School attributes refer to the degree of urbanisation of the
school environment; class attributes refer to the pupils’ religious back-
ground (Catholic, Protestant or Muslim). Personal attributes concern the
teachers’ general personal attributes (gender, age), religious attributes
and pedagogical concept.7 We expect that teachers with many non-Catholic
pupils will favour the heteronomy approach. If large groups of pupils
and parents have no links with the Catholic Church, we surmised, the
inclination to have children initiated into that church will decline and
preference for the autonomy approach will increase. In regard to reli-
gious personal attributes we expect high scores on these attributes to
result in strong agreement with transmission of Christian values as the
aim of moral education. As for pedagogical concept, we expect teach-
ers who endorse ‘heteronomous’aims for moral education to favour dis-
cipline. After all, the purpose of civic education and transmission of
values is that children should internalise certain values. This accords
with a pedagogics focused on discipline and aimed at enabling children
eventually to regulate their own behaviour (Van der Ven 1998, 49-62).
A pedagogical approach that allows for negotiation, on the other hand,
is expected to correlate positively with autonomous aims of moral edu-
cation: by allowing scope for negotiation educators/teachers indicate that
their own notions of proper behaviour are equally open to correction
and criticism.
4.2. Data Collection and Measuring Instrument
At the start of the 1997/98 school year school leaders were sent a letter
asking if they were prepared to bring the study to the attention of their
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teaching colleagues. Only group teachers could participate in the research.
Group teachers are those who teach (almost) every subject to their classes.
They teach pupils in the 4 to 12 age group. If they teach at Catholic schools,
they have to hold a certificate recognised by the Catholic Church as qual-
ifying them to provide religious education.
It is not known how many teachers are employed at Catholic schools,
but we did have a survey of all Catholic primary schools. This was the
sampling basis of our study. Because we wanted to know whether religious
pluriformity influenced teacher’s views on the aims of religious and moral
education we opted for stratification based on urbanisation. Since most Mus-
lims live in urban areas, that is where one would expect to find the great-
est religious pluriformity.
We constructed five strata. Degree of urbanisation of the area in which
a school is located was based on address density per km2. These data were
obtained from the Central Bureau of Statistics. We had decided in advance
on a sample of 600 teachers. On the basis of these considerations we drew
our sample as follows.
Table 1. Description of sample stratified in terms of urbanisation 
among teachers at Catholic primary schools
stratum definition no. of RC %schools = no. of teachers
primary schools %sample (% of 600)
very highly >2500 addresses 148 10,0 60
urbanised per km2
highly urbanised 1500-<2500 273 18,6 112
addresses per km2
fairly urbanised 1000-<1500 323 22,9 137
addresses per km2
slightly urbanised 500-<1000 225 15,3 92
addresses per km2
not urbanised <500 addresses 501 34,1 205
per km2
total 1470 100,9% 600
From the various strata we drew schools whose leaders had responded. They
indicated on a response form how many teachers they anticipated would
be prepared to complete the questionnaire. This number, furnished with a
code on the basis of which the response form could be slotted into the appro-
priate stratum, was sent to the school concerned.
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In many instances school leaders were a trifle optimistic in their esti-
mates of numbers of teachers that would be prepared to answer the ques-
tionnaire. Of the 634 teachers who were sent questionnaires only 469 returned
them properly completed. This number was distributed across the strata in
accordance with the predetermined percentages.
4.3. Results
The first research question was: what aims do teachers at Catholic primary
schools identify for moral education in a pluralistic society? We expected
the four aims identified in the theoretical domain to occur in the empirical
domain as well. However, factor analysis revealed a factor structure that
differed somewhat from the theoretical domain described above. As is evi-
dent in table 2 this structure comprises three factors.
Table 2. Aims of moral education, relative frequencies, (h2), factor loadings 
(PAF, Oblimin rorated factor matrix), estimated reliability (alpha) and 
scale means
item % % % h2 f1 f2 f3
I believe it is important to . . . disagree neutral agree
teach children how to engage in 1.5 8.7 89.3 .55 .89
dialogue with values and norms
deriving from different religious
traditions and world-views
enable children to engage in 2.1 11.9 85.3 .42 .70
dialogue with values and norms
deriving from different traditions
and world-views
teach children to clarify their 1.7 5.1 93.0 .59 .66 –.22
moral views for themselves
enable children to become aware 1.7 3.8 93.8 .60 .56 .17 –.20
of their own moral views
inculcate in children the values 2.8 12.6 84.4 .36 .74
that are important in the Christian
tradition
make children aware of how to 9.6 26.7 63.5 .36 .73
judge good and bad in accordance
with values that are important in
the Christian tradition
instil in children values that apply 1.7 4.7 93.2 .45 –.79
in our society
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transmit values that are generally 2.1 13.6 83.6 .44 –.74
accepted in our society
Alpha/ rho .84 .70 .75
N (missing) 462(7) 468(1) 465(4)
scale mean (s.d.) 4.3 3.9 4.3
(.56) (.73) (.66)
variance explained: 75%. absolute values less then .10 have been suppressed.
Legend:
f1: Communicative clarification
f2: Transmission of Christian values
f3: Civic education
The analysis presents some surprising results. Firstly, it appears that teach-
ers make no distinction between the two aims of the autonomy approach:
they see value clarification and communication of values as a single goal.
Since the two items on communication of values yield the highest factor
loadings, we call this new aim communicative clarification. Under the het-
eronomy approach teachers do discern two aims. Hence the research results
do not altogether conform to the expectation that teachers would distin-
guish between two autonomy and two heteronomy aims.
The answer to the second research question (to what extent do teachers
agree with the aim?) can also be found in table 2: they agree with all three
aims. This result conflicts with our second expectation, namely that agree-
ment with the aims of the autonomy approach would not correlate with
agreement with the aims of the heteronomy approach. Another striking fea-
ture is that, relative to the other aims, transmission of Christian values scores
poorly. The score distribution (first three columns in the table) show that
the low scores are attributable mainly to the comparatively large number
of doubtful and ‘anti-votes’ in response to ‘I believe it is important to make
children aware of how to judge good and bad in accordance with values
that are important in the Christian tradition’
The third research question concerns the way teachers interrelate the aims.
We anticipated that the correlation between the two aims of the autonomy
approach and those of the heteronomy approach would be negative. Figure
1 represents the observed correlations.
Table 2 (cont.)
item % % % h2 f1 f2 f3
I believe it is important to . . . disagree neutral agree
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The figure shows that the hypothesis regarding a positive correlation be-
tween the two aims of the heteronomy approach has empirical support. In
the empirical domain the items on the two aims of the autonomy approach
discerned in the theoretical domain combine into a single aim. Our last
hypothesis (aims of the autonomy approach correlate negatively with those
of the heteronomy approach) has no empirical support: the observed cor-
relation between the aims of the heteronomy approach and the aim of the
autonomy approach is positive.
This answers the third research question (to what extend do teachers inter-
relate the aims?). The teachers correlate all aims positively.
Before looking for a possible explanation for this finding, let us con-
sider the answer to our last research question: which categories of teach-
ers subscribe to particular perspectives/aims? To answer this question we
had to calculate associations (etas) and correlations (r) depending on the
level of measurement of variables. Appendix 1 describes how we arrived
at the various categories. Appendix 2 indicates which groups display
significantly different means.
Figure 1. Correlations between aims of moral education
heteronomy approach autonomy approach
civic education
community values
communicative
clarification.52
.52
.56
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Table 3. Associations (eta’s) and correlations (r) between aims of 
moral education, characteristics of teachers, and characteristics 
of teaching environment
Communicative Civic Transmission
clarification education of Christian
values
eta r eta r eta r
General demographic
characteristics
Gender .05 .06 .17*
Age .09 .13 .35*
Religious characteristics
Church involvement .05 . .08 . .42*
Practice of prayer .14 .10 .28*
Faith in God .04 .07 .19*
Religious self-definition .06 .24*
Religious salience of life –.02 –.05 .37*
decisions
Religious salience of professional .02 –.04 .41*
attitudes
Pedagogical concept
Pedagogical concept focused on .27* .39* .40*
discipline
Pedagogical concept allows for .34* .17 .12
negotiation
Characteristics of the school
and class
Urbanization .11 .08 .04
Proportion of Catholic children .14*
per class
Proportion of Muslim children .12*
per class
*p ≤ 0.05
We discuss the relations per aim. The more teachers agree with discipline,
the more they agree with communicative clarification. The same applies when
they leave scope for negotiation: again they attach greater value to com-
municative clarification. Teachers estimated to have between 50% and 75%
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Catholic pupils in their class agree more with communicative clarification
that those estimated to have less than 25% pupils from Catholic homes.
Teachers who estimate that they have 25% Muslim pupils are more in agree-
ment with communicative clarification than those who put the percentage
between 0 and 5. Agreement with the aim of civic education correlates pos-
itively with pedagogical concept focused on discipline.
In the transmission of Christian values gender, age, all religious personal
traits and pedagogical concept all play a role. Males agree with this aim
more than females. Teachers over the age of 35 agree more than youngerones.
Teachers who describe themselves as nonreligious agree less with this aim
than do Catholics or (other) Christians. Teachers who define themselves as
religious agree less with transmission of Christian values as an aim of moral
education than those who describe themselves as Catholic. The correlation
between the two forms of religious self-definition and transmission of Christian
values is positive. Finally, transmission of Christian values correlates pos-
itively with a pedagogical concept focusing on discipline.
The results of the inquiry into the relation between aims and personal
attributes confirm the surmise that personal religious attributes correlate
positively with initiation into Christian community values. By contrast the
anticipated negative correlation with the aims of the heternomy approach
does not materialise, but the expected positive correlation between disci-
plinary pedagogical concept and the heteronomy approach does. Likewise
the expected correlation between a pedagogical concept with scope for nego-
tiation and communicative clarification is empirically confirmed.
Finally it is noteworthy that there is a correlation between class com-
position and communicative clarification, whereas we were expecting a cor-
relation with transmission of Cristian values. These correlations cannot be
explained on the basis of our research data and call for further research.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Our theoretical premise was that there are two approaches to moral educa-
tion. One either tries to cultivate skills that help children develop into critical,
autonomous moral subjects or one seeks to make them internalise a particu-
lar set of values. In the first case no attempt is made to provide a substan-
tive definition of the content of ethics and education is confined to inculcating
procedures deemed necessary to arrive at an autonomous moral judgment.
This we called the autonomy approach. Within this approach we made a
further distinction between two procedures (clarification and communication
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of values). The attempt to transmit a particular set of values we called a
heteronomy approach. Again we distinguished between two kinds of value
transmission (civic education and transmission of Christian values). We
anticipated a positive correlation between the aims of the autonomy and
heteronomy approaches, but that the aims of the autonomy approach would
correlate negatively with those of the heteronomy approach.
As anticipated, teachers make a distinction between autonomous and het-
ernomous aims of moral education but, counter to expectation, they do not
discern two aims within the autonomy approach: calarification of values
and communication of values are seem as a single aim. This raises the ques-
tion of how they understand the relation between one’s own values and
those of other people. Paul Ricoeur offers a possible explanation. He main-
tains that we should not draw too sharp a line between clarification of one’s
own preferences and dialogue with and about other people’s values.
According to him any moral awareness worthy of the name starts with an
affirmation of one’s own freedom. Only a free being, that is to say one that
can be different from what he or she is at present, is capable of morality.
Unlike Kant, who sees freedom as willingness to comply with universal
moral law, Ricoeur insists that the only freedom worth having is that which
starts with individual reflection on what is of value to me. That which I
could value merely needs to be mediated by ‘others’. In that case freedom
is no longer an abstract principle but a task to be accomplished in a world
in which others have already realised the good life. A web of traditions,
institutions and ongoing debates and conflicts, of ongoing projects of the
good life determines the limits and possibilities of my own life project (Ricoeur
1995).
In terms of Ricoeur’s moral phenomenology value clarification and
communication of values may be regarded as two elements in the devel-
opment of moral discourse which necessarily complement each other.
Value clarification refers to (the development of) individual reflection on
what each individual learner finds valuable and at inculcating skills to refine
this perception in dialogue with other perceptions. Transmission of values
features as soon as the learner is confronted with the limits imposed by the
cultural environment in which she or he grows up.
Tim Sprod (2001) likewise tempers the opposition between autonomy
and heteronomy that has been considered irreconcilable ever since Kant.
In developing his theory of moral education Sprod proceeds from a model
of dependent autonomy. He describes it as dialogical, situated, embodied
and emotional (Sprod 2003, 80) and distances himself from both Kant’s
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monologic ethics of universality and Habermas’s dialogic ethics, of which
Benhabib (1992, 58-70, quoted in Sprod 2003, 80) said that Habermas offers
a description of dialogue between two (or more) generalised others dis-
cussing an ideal speech situation. According to Sprod, anyone who pro-
ceeds from real-life dialogues is dealing with mutually committed people,
who develop both the form of their thinking and the contents of their emo-
tions in dependence on and in communication with other people. To engage
in fruitful dialogue with others one has to learn to think correctly (Sprod
2003, 48-59), that is to say, one must be versed in the procedural aspects
of (ethical) thought.
But, as Ricoeur points out, thought always occurs in an environment where
notions of the good life are already present, before I start thinking about
them. As a result the procedures of moral thought always relate to concrete
notions of good conduct in a particular situation. If the heteronomy approach
is seen not as mechanical transmission of a body of traditional values and
norms but as bequeathing spiritual capital to the next generation to apply
in its own, creative way, then what we have called the autonomy and the
heteronomy approach – that is, cultivating autonomy and transmitting val-
ues – are not as irreconcilable as one might think. Both forms of trans-
mitting values point out to pupils the limits that the two traditions impose
on the development of the good life and the possibilities they offer. Thus
the Christian component of Christian value transmission could lie in mak-
ing concrete appeals to pupils to view situations from the angle of mar-
ginalised fellow humans and acting accordingly, rather than in imprinting
concrete behavioural rules (cf. Van der Ven 1998, 216-223). Similarly, in
civic education the emphasis could be on cultivating an attitude of toler-
ance and respect and a sense of justice rather than on learning or unlearn-
ing specific rules of decorum.
If transmission of Christian and civic values is conceived as learning
certain fixed notions and connected rules of behaviour, it would be difficult
to explain how the ‘closed’ concept of transmission can be reconciled with
the autonomy approach. This is not what the concept of ‘dependent auton-
omy’ implies. In order to be able think for themselves (autonomy) trans-
mission of values is needed (heteronomy). Autonomy is the ultimate goal
of moral education, but this always implies an heteronomous aspect in the
sense that autonomy is ‘dependent’ on moral tradition which are transmit-
ted to pupils.
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APPENDIX 1. DESCRIPTION OF THE BACKGROUND VARIABLES
We included four categories of background variables: general demographic
characteristics, personal religious characteristics, personal professional
characteristics, and environmental characteristics. The general character-
istics were age and sex. Under personal religious characteristics we dis-
tinguished between a structural and a cultural dimension. The structural
dimension comprised church membership, church attendance and extent
of active involvement in the church community. A cumulative scale of church
involvement was constructed, on the basis of which respondents were divided
into non-members, marginal members, modal members, active but not rit-
ually involved members, and core members. The cultural dimension com-
prised religious self-definition, belief in God/a higher power, prayer practice
and religious saliency. Religious saliency refers to the degree to which faith
plays a role in certain important decisions and professional attitudes. Teach-
ers were asked about the role of faith in the following areas: attitude towards
pupils, attitude towards colleagues, attitude towards their responsibility as
educators, attitude towards their responsibilities as teachers, choice of pro-
fession, involvement in social issues, choice of a life partner, choice of
recreational activities, and choice of a Catholic school as a workplace. Two
factors emerged, together accounting for 60.8% of the variance. The first
factor we call ‘religious saliency in regard to professional attitude’ and the
second ‘religious saliency in regard to life decisions’. Under personal pro-
fessional characteristics we measured respondents’ general views on ped-
agogy and education. We made a distinction between a disciplinarian
approach and an approach which allows for negotiation. An example of
the disciplinarian approach would be: ‘Above all, the school must demand
diligence and hard work from pupils.’ The statement, ‘Pupils should have
a say in decisions about teaching methods’, illustrates the approach which
allows for negotiation. Respondents were given six statements which they
rated on a five-point scale, with 1 representing ‘strongly disagree and 5
representing ‘strongly agree’. On the basis of factor analysis two scales
were constructed, corresponding to the two approaches that had been
identified theoretically. Two environmental characteristics were included
in the analysis: degree of urbanization of the school’s location, and degree
of religious diversity in the class. To determine the second characteristic
teachers were asked to estimate the percentages of Catholic, Protestant and
Islamic pupils in their classes. The percentage of Protestant pupils was too
low to be incorporated into the analysis.
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APPENDIX 2. SUMMARIES OF SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN ACCEPTANCE OF THE
MODEL BY LEVELS OF RELIGIOUS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS
Table 4. Proportion of Catholic children per class
mean (s.d.) <25% 24%-50 51%-75% >75%
<25% 4.4(.49)
25%-50% 4.3(.48)
51%-75% 4.2(.64) *
>75% 4.3(.53)
mean (s.d.) of the entire population 4.3 (.54). total cases 469, missing cases 10. sig. .028
eta = .14, eta squared = .02
Table 5. Proportion of Islamic children per class
mean (s.d) <5% 6%-25% >25%
<5% 4.2(.55)
6%-25% 4.3(.71)
>25% 4.5(.51) *
mean (s.d.) of the entire population 4.3 (.55). total cases 460, missing cases 9. sig. .033 eta
= .12, eta squared = .01
Siginificant differences (p≤.05) by transmission of christian values
Table 6. Gender
mean (s.d)
4.1 (.67) man
3.8 (.76) vrouw
Table 7. Age
mean (s.d) 26-35 jaar <25 jaar 36-45 jaar
<25 jaar 3.6 (.73)
26-35 jaar 3.5 (.83)
36-45 jaar 3.9 (.69) *
46-55 jaar 4.1 (.67) * * *
>56 jaar 4.4 (.61) * * *
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Tabel 8. Church Involvement
mean (s.d) Geen kerklid Randkerkelijk
Geen kerklid 3.4 (.74)
Randkerkelijk 3.9 (.66) *
Actief, niet-ritueel 4.0 (.79) *
Niet-actief ritueel 4.2 (.64) * *
kernlid 4.3 (.63) * *
Table 9. Practice of prayer
mean (s.d) Never Seldom
Never 3.4 (.89)
Seldom 3.6 (.67)
Sometimes 3.9 (.66) *
Regularly 4.0 (.69) * *
Every day 4.1 (.72) * *
Table 10. Faith in God
mean (s.d) Twijfel eraan
non-belief/difficult to belief 3.7 (.66)
having doubts 3.6 (.69)
believer 4.0 (.72) *
Table 11. religious self-definition
mean (s.d) Catholic
Catholic 4.1 (.71)
Christian 4.0 (.66)
Religious 3.6 (.73) *
Non-religious 3.2 (.89) *
NOTES
1. Hofstee (1992, 271; our translation) cites a striking example of this rejection of any form
of induction: ‘To the extent that one becomes aware of conveying certain non-universal values
to pupils one should desist from such indoctrination.’
2. The term derives from Kirschenbaum 1977, 148.
3. According to Rawls (2001 196) the moral psychology of a liberal political philosophy is
based on the notion that citizens are capable of forming a conception of what is good and what
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is just. Rawls holds that the state’s primary task is to ensure ‘justice as fairness’. The state can
only do so when the majority of citizens have a sense of fairness. To this Rawls (2001, 141) adds
that such a sense of fairness can only exist if it offers scope for ‘ways of life that can gain devoted
support’. Different ways of life can only be accommodated when citizens respect differences in
the pursuit of the good. Besides a sense of fairness, a morally mature subject must have a sense
of the good.
4. In a lot of American literature the debate on the extent to which the state is entitled to pro-
mote more ‘substantial values’ than just passive tolerance, if necessary against parents’ wishes,
takes the form of commentaries on the verdict of the federal High Court in the case of Yoder vs
Wisconsin. The full text of the arrest can be found on the Internet: http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/
scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=406&invol=205.
5. The once sectoralized Dutch society, in which all social and political life was subdivided
into ‘sectors’ (zuilen, lit. ‘pillars’) based on world-view, still comes closest to such negative tol-
erance. Nonetheless there were constant cross-boundary alliances between different sectors when
common interests required it.
6. Cf. e.g. Gill 1998, 25-32 and 152-157 for the relation between liberalism and Catholicism
in Latin America. For developments in Western Europe, see McLeod 1996, 9-28
7. For a detailed description of background characteristics see appendix 1.
LITERATURE
Bellah, R. (et al.). (1985) Habits of the Heart. Individualism and Commitment in American Life.
Berkeley California [etc]. University of California Press.
De Bruijn, J. (red.) (1996). Geen heersende kerk, geen heersende staat: de verhouding tussen
kerken en staat 1796-1996. Zoetermeer. Meinema.
Darling, L. (2002). The Essential Moral Dimensions of Citizenship Education: What Should We
Teach? Journal of Educational Thought. Vol. 36, No. 3. 229-247.
Etzioni, A. (ed.) (1998). The Essential Communitarian Reader. Lanham Md. [etc]. Rowman and
Littlefield.
Enslin P., Pendlebury, S. & Tjiattas, M. (2001) Deliberative Democracy, Diversity and the Challenges
of Citizenship Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education. Vol. 35, No. 1.
Galston, W. (1991). Liberal Purposes. Goods, Virtues and Diversity in the Liberal State.
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
——. (1995). Two Concepts of Liberalism. Ethics. 105, 516-534.
Grasso, K. (1995). Beyond Liberalism. In: Grasso, K. e.a.: Catholicism, Liberalism and Com-
munitarism. The Catholic Intellectual Tradition and the Moral Foundation of Democracy, 29-58.
Gutmann, A. (1995). Civic Education and Social Diversity. Ethics 105, 557-579.
Hofstee, W. (1992). Een curriculum voor burgerschap? In; Gunsteren, H. van en Hoed, P. den:
Burgerschap in praktijken deel I. ’s-Gravenhage. Sdu uitgeverij. 261-281.
Kant, I.Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten.
Kirschenbaum, H. (1977). Advanced Value Clarification. La jolla (Calif.) University Associates.
Kymlicka, W. (2000). Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship.
New York. Oxford University Press.
Novak, M. (1984). Freedom with Justice. Catholic Social Thought and Liberal Institutions. San
Francisco. Harper & Row.
——. (1989). Free Persons and the Common Good.
Raths, E., Harmin, M. & Simon, S. (1966). Values and Teaching: Working with Values in the
Classroom. Columbus Ohio. Charles E. Merill Publishing.
Rawls, J. (1993). Political Liberalism. New York. Columbia University Press.
Ricoeur, P. (1993). Tekst en betekenis. Opstellen over de interpretatie van literatuur. Baarn. Ambo.
Roebben, B. (1995). Een tijd van opvoeden. Moraalpedagogiek in christelijk perspectief. Leuven.
Acco.
JET_f3_172-196  11/23/04  3:41 PM  Page 195
196 PATRICK ALTENA, CHRIS A.M. HERMANS AND PEER L.H. SCHEEPERS
Rousseau, J.J. (1967) Emile ou De l’Education. Paris. Garnier.
Sprod, T. (2001). Philosophical Discussion in Moral Education: the Community of Ethical Inquiry.
London. Routledge
Ven, J. van der, (1998). Formation of the Moral Self. Grand Rapids (Mich.)/Cambridge (U.K.).
Eerdmans.
Patrick Altena was researcher at the Department of Practical Theology,
Radboud University Nijmegen.
Chris A.M. Hermans is professor of Practical Theology at the Radboud
University Nijmegen.
Peer L.H. Scheepers is professor of Research Methodology at the Radboud
University Nijmegen.
Address for correspondence: Prof. Dr. C. Hermans, Radboud University
Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1, NL 6525 HT Nijmegen.
JET_f3_172-196  11/23/04  3:41 PM  Page 196
